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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
In the Matter of the Estate of 
JOHN W. BAUM, 
) 
Deceased. ~ CASE NO. 8422 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent agrees with the statement of facts as set 
forth in appellants' brief except the following, which has 
been omitted, and which respondent feels is a pertinent fact 
in the case: At the hearing in the District Court before 
the HJonorable Judge R. L. Tuekett the parties entered into 
an oral stipulation that any technical objections to the pe-
tition for partial distribution would be waived and that the 
hearing would be held solely upon the construction of the 
will and the determination of the interests of George Baum 
and Oliver Baum in the said estate (R. 33.) 
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STA'fEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT ONE 
THE WILL OF JOHN W. BAUM IS UNAMBIGUOUS, 
DEFINITE AND CERTAIN AND THE INTENTION OF 
THE TESTATOR CAN DEFINITELY BE ASCERTAINED 
FROM THE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE WILL 
ITSELF, AND THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN SO HOLD-
ING. 
POINT TWO 
EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE IS INADMISSIBLE TO 
VARY, CONTRADICT OR EXPLAIN THE TERMS OF 
A WILL UNDER THE FACT SITUATION AS PRESEN-
TED BY THE WILL OF JOHN W. BAUM. 
THE ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE WILL OF JOHN W. BAUM IS UNAMBIGUOUS, 
DEFINITE AND CERTAIN AND THE INTENTION OF 
THE TESTATOR CAN DEFINITELY BE ASCERTAINED 
FROM THE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE WILL 
ITSELF, AND THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN SO HOLD-
ING. 
In analyzing the argument of appellants it appears 
that they have quoted isolated paragraphs of the testator's 
will and atte,mpted to ascertain the intention of the testa-
tor from such isola ted paragraphs. We have been unable 
to find any case allowing such to be done. On the contrary 
there are numerous cases holding that the intention of the 
testator is to be collected from the entire will and not from 
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any one paragraph contained therein. We cite as sustain-
ing this principle of law: 
In Re: Northcutt's Estate 
16 Calif. 2d 683 
107 P. 2d 607 
We invite the Court to read the entire will of John W. 
B:mm and after doing so we submit that there can be no 
doubt as to the intention of the testator to cut George Baum · 
and Oliver Baum off with the sum of one dollar and no more. 
We think there can be no dispute as to the rule of law 
that the intention of the testator governs and with that the 
further rule that if that intention can be ascertained from 
within the four corners of the will itself there can be no 
room for introduction of parol or extrinsic evidence. 
Section 74-2-1, Utah Code Annotated (1953 
"Tesiator's intention governs.-A will is to be construed 
according to the intention of the testator. Where his 
intention can not have effect to its full extent, it must 
have effect as far as possible." 
\Ve also refer to the following authorities: 
In Re: Poppleton Estate. 
34 Utah, 285, 97 P. 138, fnd particularly Paragraph 1135. 
~lso: Vol. 57, Am. Jur. 
Appellants in their brlef have quoted Section 75-12-9, 
Utah Cod2 Annotated, 1953, and seem to lay great stress 
upon the provisions of that section. We wish to point out 
that this section in no way alters the rule that the intention 
qf the te3tatcr must govern and that if that intention can 
be determined from the will itself no extrinsic evidence is 
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admissible. This section only operates when questions have 
been raised by the will itself with respect to the amount of 
advancements. 
With respect to appellants' averment of the friendly 
relations between the testator and his two sons, the law is 
definitely settled that evidence of friendly or unfriendly re-
lations between testator and the beneficiary is not admis-
sible to show intention of the testator to include or exclude 
such beneficiary. 
Vol. 4, Page on Wills, 
(Lifetime Edition) 
Section 1627, page 676 
Moffatt vs. Heon, 
136 N. E. 123 
Appellants, at Page 7 of their brief, quote the following 
clause from paragraph XI of the will of John W. Baum, "It 
is my desire to treat all of my children alike in the dispo-
sition of my property." Appellants lay great stress upon 
this clause at various places in their brief in an attempt to 
show that the testator was confused or that there was some 
ambiguity in the will with respect to his intention. How-
ever, appellants did not include the remainder of the sen-
tence, which reads as follows, "and the aforesaid provisions 
accomplish this result in as fair and equal a manner as could 
be done." , 
When this paragraph is taken in light of the disposi-
tions made by the testator of his property in the will as con-
tained in paragraphs IV, V, and VI. no stretch of the imag-
ination can conceive of any ambiguity. 
We submit that the testator, without question, intended 
George Baum and Oliver Baum to receive the sum of one 
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dollar each and no n1ore. We further submit that the entire 
will, when read as a whole, definitely shows such-intention, 
and the various paragraphs therein cited by appellants in 
an attempt to show some ambiguity, are merely explana-
tions by the testator for doing what he has clearly done. 
POINT TWO 
EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE IS INADMISSIBLE TO 
VARY, CONTRADICT OR EXPLAIN THE TERMS OF 
A WILL UNDER THE FACT SITUATION AS PRESEN-
TED BY THE WILL OF JOHN W. BAUM. 
In examining appellants' brief and the record on ap-
peal, and particularly the petition of appellants for construc-
tion of the will, we note that they lay great stress upon their 
contention that the testator was mistaken as to the amount 
of property which he had previously given to various ones, 
and particularly to the appellants. The law is well settled. 
that error or mistake on the part of the testa tor as to the 
fact or amount of advancements alleged to have been made 
in the will does not permit the introduction of extrinsic evi-
dence to vary or contradict the terms of the will. 
We have found no case contrary to that statement, but 
we find numerous authorities in support thereof. We cite 
the following representing such decisions: 
Vol. 4, Page on Wills, 
(Lifetime Edition) 
Section 1627, page 676 
Hopper vs. Sellers ( Kan.) 
139 P. 365 
In Re: Woelk's Estate (Kan.) 
296 P. 359 
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Am. Jur. Vol. 57, 
Page 67 4 and page 680 
In Re: Tompkins (Cal.) 
64 P. 268 
Buchanan vs. Hlunter, (Iowa) 
148 Northwestern, 881 
La venue vs. Lewis, (Ark.) 
46 s. w. 2d 649 
Bimslager vs. Bimslager, (Ill.) 
154, Northeastern, 135 
La Flore vs. Handlin, (Ark.) 
240 Southwestern 712 
We further refer the Court's attention to the annota-
tion in 
94 A. L. R., commencing at Page 26 
In further establishing Point Two we wish to discuss 
some of the cases cited above more in detail. With respect 
to the allegation of appellants that the testator was mis-
taken when he said that they had had their share of his 
property we wish to refer to Hopper vs. Sellers, cited above. 
In that case testatrix recited in her will that two sons were 
indebted to her in stated amounts and that if such amounts 
were not paid before her death they should be deducted from 
their distributive shares. The sons offered proof that testat-
rix was mistaken and that they were not indebted in such 
amormts. Held, as a matter of law that such proof is not 
admissible. 
In Re: Woell<:'s Estate, cited above, is to the same 
effect. 
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In Buchanan vs. Hunter, cited above, the testator, in 
attempting to equalize the distribution between his daugh-
ters stated that one daughter had received advancements 
amounting to $40,000.00. The daughter claimed such to be 
a mistake, and that she had .actually received not to exceed 
$15,000.00. Held, that such evidence, as a matter of law, 
was inadmissible. 
In Bimslager vs. Bimslager, cited above, the Court said, 
"The main object in construing a will is to find the inten-
tions of the testa tor. Extrinsic evidence is never admissible 
for the purpose of varying the intention of the testator as 
expressed in the will itself." 
No words can be added to or taken from a will which 
change the plain meaning of the testator. No will can be 
reformed because of a mistake made therein by the testator. 
We refer the Court to Lavenue vs. Lewis, cited above. 
In that case the will stated that the testator made no pro-
vision for certain named sons because of previous advance-
ments equal to their interests in his estate. It was held that 
evidence regarding such advancements were inadmissible. 
Also, LeFlore vs. Handlin, cited above, where a will giv-
ing $100.00 to a son and each of his children stated that the 
testatrix purposely made no further provision for them be-
cause the son had received a larger share of the father's 
estate than the other children. Evidence was not admissible 
to show that testatrix was mistaken as to the amount re-
ceived by the son from his father's estate. 
Appellants rely strongly upon the case of In Re: Pick-
ard's Estate, 41 Utah 145; 129 P. 353. We have no argu-
ment with the rule laid down in that case, but wish to point 
out that the fact situation in that case is wholly different 
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from that in the case at bar. We quote from the portion 
of the will in the case of: In Re: Pickard's Estate, as follows: 
"all of the residue of my property . . . . I give and 
bequath .... in trust for the benefit of my said 
daughter and of my son .... equally, except so far 
as sums have been or shall be set off against the inter-
ests which either would be entitled to under the pro .. 
visions of this will, respectively, in case such sums had 
remained a part of the assets of the estate; THE 
SHARE OF MY SAID DAUGHTER AND SON TO BE 
DETERMINED AS OF THE DATE OF MY DE-
CEASE." ( empha sis supplied.) 
Obviously in that case testimony had to be introduced 
to indicate what, if any, amount should be set off as against 
the interests which either the daughter or the son would be 
entitled to. In the case at bar there is no such ambiguity. 
The will definitely states that George and Oliver have had 
their share and hence there is no room for any extrinsic evi-
dence to contradict that statement. 
In their statement of facts ,at Page 4 of appellants' 
brief, reference is made to a certain discharge agreement 
between appellants and the testator alleged to have been 
executed sometime around 1928. We refer the Court's at-
tention to the case of: In Re: Tompkins, above cited. In 
this case there was an instrument executed many years pre-
viously and which the court refused to allow in evidence and 
which, we feel, very nearly proximates the situation in the 
Baum estate. 
We refer the Court's attention to the language in 64 P. 
at P~ge 270, as follows: 
"It would render the entire clause inoperative if it 
should be held that its provisions could be defeated by 
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an inference to be drawn from an instrument executed 
many years previously, and to which the will makes 
no reference." 
Appellants have spent considerable time in their brief 
pointing to the various authorities with respect to latent and 
patent ambiguities. We submit that there is neither type 
to be found in the John W. Baum will. Counsel cites the 
case of Payne vs. Todd, 43 P. 2d, 1004 (1935). We submit 
that this case is very similar to the Utah case of: In Re: Pick-
ard's Estate, cited above, but that the fact situation is en-
tirely distinguishable from that of the case at bar. 
We refer to Page 1004 of 43 P. 2d and quote from the 
will as follows: 
"Fourth: I release and forgive my son Stanley T. 
Payne, whether living at my death or not, the sum of 
approximately $3000.00 and interest which may be un-
paid at the date of my death, or such part of said prin-
cipal sum and interest as shall remain unpaid; the said 
swn being the amount loaned by me to my said son, it 
being my purpose to have the said debt cancelled, if it 
still exists at the time of my death, and this cancella-
tion is made as a part of the share of my estate which 
might otherwise be bequeathed to him, and my said son 
will understand this arrangement." 
"Seventh: All the rest and residue of the property of 
which I die possessed, I bequeath and devise unto my 
said five children, to be distributed equally among them, 
share and share alike." 
Let us compare the two paragraphs above from the will 
of Edwin C. Payne to paragraphs IV, V, and VI of the will 
of John W. Baum, which are as follows: 
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"IV. I hereby give, devise and bequeath to my son, 
Oliver Baum, the sum of One Dollar ($1.00) and no 
more, he having heretofore received in real property 
his full share of my estate. 
"V. I hereby give, devise and bequeath to my son, 
George Baum, the sum of One Dollar ($1.00) and no 
more, he having heretofore received in real property 
his full share of my estate." 
"VI. I hereby devise, give and bequeath all the rest, 
residue and remainder of my property and estate, 
wheresoever it may be situate, whether it be real, per-
sonal, or mixed, to Newell H. Baum and Vadis B. Mc-
Omber, and Ora Baum Nielson, and IVJ:urray Baum, each 
to share and share alike." 
We submit that after reading the above paragraphs 
there could be little question that the fact situation in the 
Payne vs. Todd case is wholly distinguishable from that of 
the case at bar. In the former the intention of the testator 
is not clear, whereas in the Baum case the testator has left 
no room for conjecture as to his intention, and hence parol 
evidence is inadmissible to vary the same. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion we submit that fron1 a reading of the en-
tire will of John W. Baum there can be no question but that 
the intention of the testator was clearly set out to bequeath 
to Oliver Baum and George Baum one dollar each and no 
more. And, further, a reading of the entire will shows the 
same_ to be clear and unambiguous. 
We also submit that the law is well settled in such cases 
that no extrinsic or parol evidence is admissible to vary or 
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contradict the tenns of the will or the intention of the tes-
tator as contained therein. It necessarily follows that the 
findings and order of the Trial Court should be sustained 
and affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ARNOLD C. ROYLANCE, 
Attorney for Respondent 
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